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NOTE 
DONINGER V. NIEHOFF: TAKING TINKER TOO FAR 
Travis Miller† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Though the Supreme Court has laid a basic framework for teachers, 
principals, and other school officials to determine whether students can be 
disciplined for their speech, and whether student speech can be suppressed, 
the Supreme Court has yet to determine the scope of a school’s authority to 
discipline a student for speech that occurs off-campus and online.1 This has 
left both school officials and courts with the difficult task of determining 
which, if any, Supreme Court precedent applies to a student’s online 
speech. The negative implications associated with teenagers spending an 
average of twelve hours a week online (such as the increased frequency of 
cyber-bullying or online threats against teachers) does not make this 
difficult task any easier.2 
For the most part, the substantial disruption test used in Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District is the default rule that 
courts use to determine whether suppressing a student’s speech, or whether 
a student’s punishment resulting from his speech, is warranted.3 This rule 
allows a school to prohibit or punish a student’s speech where school 
authorities reasonably forecast that the student’s speech “would materially 
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.”4 But how 
and when should schools and the courts apply this substantial disruption 
test? Assuming that a school can use this test for a student’s online speech, 
                                                                                                                           
 † Notes and Comments Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 5; J.D. 
candidate, Liberty University School of Law, 2011; B.S. in Business, Liberty University, 
2005. I would first like to thank my family, and especially my parents, for their patience and 
assistance during my time in law school. Also, thanks to the members of Liberty University 
Law Review, in particular Matthew Hegarty, as their insights and suggestions helped make 
this Note possible. Soli Deo Gloria. 
 1. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 2. Jane Weaver, Teens Tune Out TV, Log on Instead, MSNBC (July 24, 2006), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3078614/. 
 3. See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The Supreme Court 
has established three frameworks for evaluating student speech: (1) vulgar and obscene 
speech is governed by Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser . . . (2) school-sponsored speech is 
governed by Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier . . . and (3) all other speech is governed by Tinker.”). 
 4. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
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should it be applied the moment school officials discover the online speech, 
or retroactively to the very moment the student created the online speech? 
Moreover, exactly how—if at all—should this test relate to a student’s 
extracurricular activities?  
Given no instructions from the Supreme Court on a school’s authority to 
discipline a student’s online speech, lower courts have used Tinker in 
“situation[s] and scenario[s] that the Court in 1969 could hardly have 
imagined.”5 In Doninger v. Niehoff, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit applied Tinker’s substantial disruption test to a message 
that high school student Avery Doninger, a junior who served on the 
Student Council as the Junior Class Secretary, posted on her publicly 
accessible blog hosted by LiveJournal.com.6 This case arose “out of a 
dispute between the school administration and a group of Student Council 
members at [Lewis Mills High School], including Avery, over the 
scheduling of an event called ‘Jamfest,’ an annual battle-of-the-bands 
concert that these Student Council members helped to plan.” Following this 
dispute, Avery encouraged her fellow students to read and respond to a 
posting on her blog, where she wrote: 
[J]amfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. . . . 
basically, because we sent [the original Jamfest email] out, Paula 
Schwartz is getting a TON of phone calls and emails and 
such. . . . however, she got pissed off and decided to just cancel 
the whole thing all together, anddd [sic] so basically we aren’t 
going to have it at all, but in the slightest chance we do[,] it is 
going to be after the talent show on may 18th.7 
Though the school discovered Avery’s posting after the dispute that it 
had been directed at was resolved, the Second Circuit still held that the 
Tinker test governed Avery’s posting and ruled for the school district.8 But 
                                                                                                                           
 5. Clay Calvert, Tinker’s Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed but Still Standing, 
58 AM. U. L. REV. 1167, 1175 (2009). 
 6. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 44-45. See generally About Us, LIVEJOURNAL, 
http://www.livejournalinc.com/aboutus.php (“LiveJournal is a community publishing 
platform, willfully blurring the lines between blogging and social networking. Since 1999 
LiveJournal has been home to a wide array of creative individuals looking to share common 
interests, meet new friends, and express themselves.”) (last visited May 1, 2011). 
 7. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527 F.3d 41 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
 8. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46 (“According to [school district superintendent Paula] 
Schwartz’s testimony, she learned of Avery’s posting only some days after the meeting 
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the court’s use of Tinker was unnecessary; the Second Circuit should have 
solely justified the disciplining of Avery on the basis that her conduct was 
against her school’s standard of conduct for those that participate in student 
government, which required Avery to “work cooperatively with [her] 
advisor and with the administration, and promote good citizenship both in 
school and out.”9 By clinging to Tinker, the Second Circuit both stretched a 
school’s authority under Tinker, and missed an important opportunity to 
reaffirm a school’s authority to discipline a student involved in 
extracurricular activities without using the Tinker test. 
This Note has five parts. Part II provides a short historical background 
on student speech, summarizes Supreme Court cases that have addressed 
the authority of schools to discipline students for their speech, briefly 
illustrates the disagreements on when and how the Tinker rule is to be 
utilized, and summarizes Wisniewski v. Board of Education, a Second 
Circuit decision that applied Tinker to a student’s online speech. Part III 
addresses the problem with the reliance on Tinker in Doninger v. Niehoff. 
Part IV argues that the Second Circuit should have decided Doninger 
without using Tinker’s substantial disruption test. In addition, Part IV 
provides an alternative solution for affirming the district court’s decision in 
a way that reinforces the authority of schools to require higher standards of 
conduct for students that participate in voluntary extracurricular activities. 
Finally, Part V reinforces two conclusions: (1) courts should apply Tinker 
cautiously to a student’s online speech, and (2) courts should follow the 
modern trend of giving schools flexibility in framing and enforcing the 
conduct requirements that students must follow when participating in 
extracurricular activities. 
II. STUDENT SPEECH AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
It has been said that “the history of public education suggests that the 
First Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect student speech 
in public schools.”10 The power of schools acting in loco parentis (in the 
                                                                                                                           
[between herself and Avery Doninger] when her adult son found it while using an Internet 
search engine.”).  
 9. Id. at 52.  
 10. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410-11 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522 (1969) (Black, J., 
dissenting)  
Nor does a person carry with him into the United States Senate or House, or 
into the Supreme Court, or any other court, a complete constitutional right to 
go into those places contrary to their rules and speak his mind on any subject 
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place of the parent) “stems from a common-law doctrine that has deep 
roots.”11 According to Sir William Blackstone, a parent may  
delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor 
or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and 
has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his 
charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary 
to answer the purpose for which he is employed.12  
Traditionally, schools acting in loco parentis were allowed to strictly 
regulate student speech without judicial interference.13 Public school 
teachers in early America instilled common values in students through strict 
discipline, and students were punished for behavior that was considered 
disrespectful, improper, indecent, or vulgar.14 In these public schools, 
“[t]eachers did not rely solely on the power of ideas to persuade; they relied 
on discipline to maintain order.”15 Case law illustrates that “[c]ourts 
routinely preserved the rights of teachers to punish speech that the school or 
                                                                                                                           
he pleases. It is a myth to say that any person has a constitutional right to say 
what he pleases, where he pleases, and when he pleases. Our Court has decided 
precisely the opposite. 
Id. But see Tony LaCroix, Student Drug Testing: The Blinding Appeal of In Loco Parentis 
and the Importance of State Protection of Student Privacy, 2008 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 251, 263 
(2008). 
  To allow fundamental constitutional protections to be set aside for the sake 
of convenience, or in deference to the interest of governmental actors charged 
with quasi-parental action, is patently contrary to the Court’s own recognition 
that school children do, without any doubt, enjoy the protection of the bedrock 
constitutional guarantees of liberty and privacy. 
Id.  
 11. ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP: THE UNINTENDED COSTS OF FREE SPEECH IN 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 9 (2009). But see LaCroix, supra note 10, at 270 (“[T]here are better 
models for describing the student/school relationship and drawing analogies for use in 
making constitutional decisions about the rights of students, for example, that of the 
doctor/patient relationship. The modern approach to public schooling is astoundingly 
diagnostic and treatment-oriented.”). 
 12. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *454. 
 13. Morse, 551 U.S. at 414 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 14. Id. at 411, 414 (“By the time the States ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, public 
schools had become relatively common. If students in public schools were originally 
understood as having free-speech rights, one would have expected 19th-century public 
schools to have respected those rights and courts to have enforced them. They did not.”). 
 15. Id. at 412. 
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teacher thought was contrary to the interests of the school and its 
educational goals.”16 
Despite the traditional view that public school authorities were allowed 
to restrict and punish student speech for nearly any reason, “the Supreme 
Court has recognized since the mid-twentieth century that students do not 
shed their constitutional rights as a condition of public school attendance.”17 
During the cultural turbulence of the late 1960s, a case reached the 
Supreme Court that would profoundly change this traditional student-
teacher dynamic.18 This case is Tinker v. Des Moines, and it is “the 
cornerstone on which the student speech right was built.”19 
A. Supreme Court Decisions on Student Speech 
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 
In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines, Iowa, decided to 
publicize their support for a peaceful resolution to the Vietnam War and to 
mourn all casualties of the War by wearing black armbands to school.20 The 
principals of their schools became aware of this plan and collectively 
“adopted a policy that any student wearing an armband to school would be 
asked to remove it, and if he refused he would be suspended until he 
returned without the armband.”21 The students were aware of this policy22 
and despite the risk of suspension, they wore black armbands to their 
schools.23 True to their word, the schools sent the students home and 
suspended them until they returned to school without their armbands.24 The 
                                                                                                                           
 16. Id. at 414.  
 17. STEPHEN B. THOMAS, NELDA H. CAMBRON-MCCABE, & MARTHA M. MCCARTHY, 
PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW: TEACHERS’ AND STUDENTS’ RIGHTS 106 (6th ed. 2009). 
 18. DUPRE, supra note 11, at 10.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 12; see also JOHN W. JOHNSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS 4 (1997). 
Among those subsequently interviewed who had attended the meeting where it was agreed 
that the students would begin wearing black armbands to class, all agreed that the act “had 
two purposes: to mourn all the casualties of the Vietnam War . . . and to support Senator 
Robert Kennedy’s call for an extension of the anticipated Christmas 1965 truce, which it was 
hoped would lead to a negotiated end of the war.” Id. 
 21. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. (“They [the students] were all sent home and suspended from school until they 
would come back without their armbands. They did not return to school until after the 
planned period for wearing armbands had expired—that is, until after New Year’s Day.”). 
308 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:303 
 
 
students, through their fathers, filed a complaint in federal district court 
seeking an injunction preventing the disciplining of the students and 
nominal damages.25 The District Court dismissed the complaint and 
“upheld the constitutionality of the school authorities’ action on the ground 
that it was reasonable in order to prevent disturbance of school 
discipline.”26 The plaintiffs appealed the case, and the Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit affirmed.27 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.28  
Upon review, the Supreme Court recognized that the problem in the case 
“lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights 
collide with the rules of the school authorities.”29 After all, students do not 
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”30 The Court found that the students were not punished 
for the expression of disruptive or intrusive speech, but for the school 
authorities’ desire to avoid the controversy that could have resulted from 
the silent expression of opposition towards the war in Vietnam.31 This type 
of “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to 
overcome the right to freedom of expression.”32 The Court noted that the 
Constitution prohibited school officials from denying this form of 
expression.33 Such speech, which requires vigilant protection even in public 
schools, could only be prohibited where it “would materially and 
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.”34 In effect, 
Tinker “made it clear that students had every right to challenge teachers and 
                                                                                                                           
 25. Id. at 503-04. 
 26. Id. at 504-05. 
 27. Id. at 505; see also JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 119.  
The appeals court ruling was contained in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. 
. . . A per curiam opinion is sometimes issued by a judicial body to mask the 
reason for a disagreement on the court. The appeals court opinion in Tinker 
served just such a purpose. It contained no analysis whatsoever; it was 
essentially an order without justification. 
Id.  
 28. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505.  
 29. Id. at 507. 
 30. Id. at 506. 
 31. Id. at 508, 510. 
 32. Id. at 508. 
 33. Id. at 514. 
 34. Id. at 513.  
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principals as long as they believed their right of free speech was being 
infringed.”35  
Justice Hugo Black, in his dissenting opinion, concluded that the 
majority in Tinker ushered in a new era in which the power to control 
students, a traditional responsibility of school officials, was transferred to 
the Supreme Court.36 According to Justice Black, Tinker was decided 
“wholly without constitutional reasons” and “subjects all the public schools 
in the country to the whims and caprices of their loudest-mouthed, but 
maybe not their brightest, students.”37 In addition, he found the record to 
demonstrate that the armbands “took the students’ minds off their classwork 
and diverted them to thoughts about the highly emotional subject of the 
Vietnam war.”38 He concluded that the majority would, in fact, allow 
students to defy openly the orders of school officials, ushering in a new and 
revolutionary era of permissiveness towards defiant student conduct.39 
Justice Harlan, in his dissent, offered a different standard to govern these 
types of cases and agreed “state public school authorities in the discharge of 
their responsibilities are not wholly exempt from the requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment respecting the freedoms of expression and 
association.”40 
2. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 
Nearly twenty years after Tinker, the Supreme Court considered Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, a case involving a Washington high 
school student who delivered a vulgar speech during a “school-sponsored 
educational program in self-government.”41 This student, Matthew N. 
Fraser, spoke in front of six-hundred high school students to nominate a 
                                                                                                                           
 35. DUPRE, supra note 11, at 24. 
 36. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 37. Id. at 525.  
 38. Id. at 518. Testimony, by some students, “shows their armbands caused comments, 
warnings by other students, the poking of fun at them, and a warning by an older football 
player that other, nonprotesting students had better let them alone.” Id. at 517. There is also 
evidence that a mathematics teacher had his lesson period practically “wrecked” chiefly by 
disputes with Mary Beth Tinker, who wore her armband for her “demonstration.” Id. 
 39. Id. at 518. 
 40. Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan proposed a different rule to govern 
student speech cases: “I would, in cases like this, cast upon those complaining the burden of 
showing that a particular school measure was motivated by other than legitimate school 
concerns—for example, a desire to prohibit the expression of an unpopular point of view, 
while permitting expression of the dominant opinion.” Id. 
 41. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986). 
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fellow student for student elective office.42 During the speech, “Fraser 
referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit 
sexual metaphor.”43 This is his speech, in whole: 
 I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm 
in his shirt, his character is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief 
in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.  
 Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. 
If necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t 
attack things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing 
until finally—he succeeds.  
 Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, 
for each and every one of you.  
 So vote for Jeff for A. S. B. vice-president—he’ll never 
come between you and the best our high school can be.44 
Fraser delivered this inappropriate speech despite warnings from two of 
his teachers that “severe consequences” may result.45 Some students 
responded to the graphic nature of the speech by yelling, while others made 
gestures that simulated the sexual acts alluded to by Fraser’s speech.46 A 
few students were embarrassed by the speech, and one teacher found it 
necessary to forego the time of a scheduled class lesson so she could 
discuss the speech with her class.47  
The next day, the school’s Assistant Principal met with Fraser and 
informed him that he had violated a school disciplinary rule prohibiting the 
use of obscene language in the school.48 Fraser admitted that he 
intentionally used “sexual innuendo in the speech.”49 He was suspended for 
three days, and told he would no longer be considered a candidate for his 
school’s commencement exercises.50 Fraser was unsuccessful in his appeal 
to the School District, which affirmed the disciplinary action.51 He then 
took his case to the United States District Court for the Western District of 
                                                                                                                           
 42. Id. at 677. 
 43. Id. at 677-78. 
 44. Id. at 687. 
 45. Id. at 675, 678.  
 46. Id. at 678. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 678-79.  
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Washington, which held, in part, that the school’s disciplinary measures 
violated Fraser’s right to free speech under the First Amendment.52 The 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, “holding that [Fraser’s] 
speech was indistinguishable” from Tinker’s armband.53 The Ninth Circuit 
rejected the School District’s claim that there had been a disruptive effect 
on the disciplinary process of the school, and “also rejected the School 
District’s argument that it had an interest in protecting an essentially 
captive audience of minors from lewd and indecent language in a setting 
sponsored by the school . . . .”54 The Ninth Circuit also “rejected the School 
District’s argument that, incident to its responsibility for the school 
curriculum, it had the power to control the language used to express ideas 
during a school-sponsored activity.”55 
The Supreme Court reversed, recognizing that “it is a highly appropriate 
function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and 
offensive terms in public discourse,” and holding that the School District 
acted within its authority “in imposing sanctions upon Fraser in response to 
his offensively lewd and indecent speech.”56 School authorities, acting in 
loco parentis, have an obvious concern to protect children from this type of 
speech.57 The Court cited its previous First Amendment decisions that 
“recognized a state interest protecting children from sexually explicit, 
vulgar, or offensive speech.”58 The Court distinguished Fraser from Tinker, 
noting that the disciplining of Mr. Fraser was “unrelated to any political 
viewpoint,” but still necessary to prevent the undermining of the “school’s 
basic educational mission.”59 According to some authors, “[t]he majority 
further rejected the contention that the student had no way of knowing that 
his expression would evoke disciplinary action; the school rule barring 
obscene and disruptive expression and teachers’ admonitions that his 
planned speech was inappropriate provided adequate warning of the 
                                                                                                                           
 52. Id. at 679. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 679-80. Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning in support of its conclusion had racial and class-based overtones: “the School 
District’s ‘unbridled discretion’ to determine what discourse is ‘decent’ would ‘increase the 
risk of cementing white, middle-class standards for determining what is acceptable and 
proper speech and behavior in our public schools.’” Id. 
 55. Id. at 680. 
 56. Id. at 682, 685. 
 57. Id. at 685.  
 58. DUPRE, supra note 11, at 53. 
 59. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.  
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consequences of the expression.”60 Fraser was a marked change from the 
student-liberty-focused Tinker standard, and it reinforced the idea that 
schools are to inculcate students in the habits and manners of civility.61 
School officials, however, still have the difficult task of determining 
whether speech is “vulgar” or “offensive.”62 “This uncertainty, combined 
with the asymmetry brought about by the attorney’s fees statute, leaves 
schools in a vulnerable position that surely has consequences for the day-to-
day learning environment in schools.”63  
3. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
In a relatively short time after the Fraser decision, the Court addressed 
the issue of whether school administrators could regulate the content of a 
student-authored, school-sponsored (and school-funded) newspaper in 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.64 This newspaper was authored by 
members of the Hazelwood East High School’s Journalism II class, and the 
school’s principal reviewed each issue of the student newspaper prior to 
publication.65 In the spring of 1983, the principal reviewed and objected to 
two articles scheduled to appear in the upcoming newspaper.66 One story 
“described three Hazelwood East students’ experiences with pregnancy; the 
other discussed the impact of divorce on students at the school.”67  
                                                                                                                           
 60. THOMAS, CAMBRON-MCCABLE, & MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 107-08. But see 
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 695 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens advocated a more objective 
approach to disruptive or offensive speech in school, stating:  
  The fact that respondent reviewed the text of his speech with three different 
teachers before he gave it does indicate that he must have been aware of the 
possibility that it would provoke an adverse reaction, but the teachers’ 
responses certainly did not give him any better notice of the likelihood of 
discipline than did the student handbook itself. In my opinion, therefore, the 
most difficult question is whether the speech was so obviously offensive that an 
intelligent high school student must be presumed to have realized that he would 
be punished for giving it. 
Id.  
 61. DUPRE, supra note 11, at 56. 
 62. Id. at 72.  
 63. Id. at 72-73.  
 64. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262, 271 (1988). 
 65. Id. at 263. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. 
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The principal’s concern was with the pregnant students being identified 
through the article (though the story had used false names),68 and with the 
inappropriateness of the article’s sexual subject matter.69 He believed that 
the article on divorce, in which a student complained that her father was not 
spending enough time at home, should allow for the father to comment on 
these remarks (or to allow for him to consent to the publication of his 
child’s remarks).70 These concerns led the principal to eliminate these 
articles from the final published newspaper.71 The students brought their 
action in federal district court, alleging their First Amendment rights were 
violated by the principal’s refusal to allow the articles to be published.72 
The district court held that “no First Amendment violation had occurred,” 
reasoning that “school officials may impose restraints on students’ speech 
in activities that are ‘an integral part of the school’s educational function’ 
. . . so long as their decision has ‘a substantial and reasonable basis.’”73 The 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that “school 
officials had violated respondents’ First Amendment rights by deleting the 
two pages of the newspaper.”74 The court concluded that the newspaper’s 
“status as a public forum precluded school officials from censoring its 
contents except when ‘necessary to avoid material and substantial 
interference with school work or discipline . . . or the rights of others.’”75  
The Supreme Court cut another exception into the Tinker standard and 
reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that “educators do not offend the 
First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content 
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their 
                                                                                                                           
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. This fear proved to be mistaken, as the student’s name had been deleted from the 
final draft of the article. 
 71. Id. at 263-64. The principal concluded that the only way for the newspaper to be 
printed before the end of the school year was “to publish a four-page newspaper instead of 
the planned six-page newspaper, eliminating the two pages on which the offending stories 
appeared, or to publish no newspaper at all.” Id. He chose “to withhold from publication the 
two pages containing the stories on pregnancy and divorce.” Id. at 264. 
 72. Id. at 264. 
 73. Id. “The court found that Principal Reynolds’ concern that the pregnant students’ 
anonymity would be lost and their privacy invaded was ‘legitimate and reasonable,’ given 
‘the small number of pregnant students at Hazelwood East and several identifying 
characteristics that were disclosed in the article.’” Id. 
 74. Id. at 265.  
 75. Id. 
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actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”76 In 
doing so, the Court deferred to the judgment of parents, teachers, and 
school officials, and also justified judicial intervention only where the 
suppression of school-sponsored student expression was unreasonable.77 
The Court reasoned that the newspaper was a “supervised learning 
experience for journalism students,” and concluded that “school officials 
were entitled to regulate the contents of Spectrum [the student newspaper] 
in any reasonable manner.”78  
The Court differentiated this case from Tinker in that while Tinker 
required a school to tolerate certain student speech, the question posed in 
this case asks “whether the First Amendment requires a school 
affirmatively to promote particular student speech.”79 The Court also 
focused on a school’s interest to “disassociate itself” not only from student 
speech that would “substantially interfere with [its] work . . . or impinge 
upon the rights of other students,” but also from student speech that may be 
“ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or 
prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.”80  
In applying Hazelwood, “[c]ourts have reasoned that the school has the 
right to disassociate itself from controversial expression that conflicts with 
its mission and have considered school-sponsored activities to include 
student newspapers supported by the public school, extracurricular 
activities sponsored by the school, school assemblies, and classroom 
activities.”81 Courts, however, have also limited a school’s authority to 
censor student expression that bears the school’s imprimatur where blatant 
viewpoint discrimination is involved.82 And, “[e]ven if viewpoint 
                                                                                                                           
 76. Id. at 273. But see id. at 280 (Brennan, J., dissenting)  
  If mere incompatibility with the school’s pedagogical message were a 
constitutionally sufficient justification for the suppression of student speech, 
school officials could censor each of the students or student organizations in 
the foregoing hypotheticals, converting our public schools into “enclaves of 
totalitarianism,” that “strangle the free mind at its source.” The First 
Amendment permits no such blanket censorship authority. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 77. Id. at 270. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 270-71. 
 80. Id. at 271 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 
(1969)). 
 81. THOMAS, CAMBRON-MCCABE, & MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 114. 
 82. Id.  
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discrimination is not involved, censorship actions in a non-public forum 
must still be based on legitimate pedagogical concerns.”83 
4. Morse v. Frederick 
Recently, the Court again deferred to the authority and judgment of 
school administrators in Morse v. Frederick.84 Morse involved actions at a 
school-sanctioned and school-supervised event to watch the Olympic Torch 
Relay pass through Juneau, Alaska.85 At this event, a group of students 
unfurled a large banner bearing the phrase: “Bong HiTS 4 JESUS.”86 The 
school’s principal, Deborah Morse, instructed the students to take down the 
banner, and every student but Frederick complied.87 Frederick was 
subsequently suspended from school for advocating the use of illegal drugs 
during a school-sanctioned activity.88 The Juneau School District 
Superintendent applied Fraser to this dispute and upheld the suspension 
(though reducing its length from ten to eight days), concluding that the 
principal acted within her authority because the banner was “speech or 
                                                                                                                           
  There are limits, however, on school authorities’ wide latitude to censor 
student expression that bears the public school’s imprimatur. Blatant viewpoint 
discrimination, even in a nonpublic forum, abridges the First Amendment. For 
example, the Ninth Circuit held that a school board violated students’ First 
Amendment rights, because it failed to produce a compelling justification for 
excluding an anti-draft organization’s advertisement from the school 
newspaper, while allowing military recruitment advertisements. Similarly, the 
Eleventh Circuit placed the burden on school authorities to justify viewpoint 
discrimination against a peace activist group that was excluded from the public 
school’s career day and not allowed to display its literature on school bulletin 
boards and in counselors’ offices, when military recruiters were allowed such 
access. The court found no compelling justification for censoring specific 
views that the board found distasteful. 
Id. at 114-15. 
 83. Id. at 115. For example, “[a] Michigan federal district court found no legitimate 
pedagogical reason for the removal from the school newspaper of a student’s article on a 
pending lawsuit alleging that school bus diesel fumes constitute a neighborhood nuisance.” 
Id.  
 84. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007). 
 85. Id. at 397. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 398. 
 88. Id.  
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action that intrudes upon the work of the schools.”89 This decision was 
upheld by the Juneau School District Board of Education.90  
Frederick filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the violation of his 
First Amendment rights by the school board and by Principal Morse.91 The 
district court granted summary judgment for the school board and for 
Principal Morse, holding that “Morse had the authority, if not the 
obligation, to stop such messages at a school-sanctioned activity.”92 The 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding “a violation of 
Frederick’s First Amendment rights because the school punished Frederick 
without demonstrating that his speech gave rise to a ‘risk of substantial 
disruption.’”93 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine, in part, 
“whether Frederick had a First Amendment right to wield his banner.”94 
The Supreme Court first set out to determine whether Fraser applied to 
this case. In doing so, the Court distilled two basic principles from Fraser.95 
“First, Fraser’s holding demonstrates that ‘the constitutional rights of 
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights 
of adults in other settings.’”96 Had the student in Fraser “delivered the same 
speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would have been 
protected.”97 “Second, Fraser established that the mode of analysis set forth 
in Tinker is not absolute,” as Fraser did not apply the substantial disruption 
analysis prescribed in Tinker.98 
Thus, rejecting both the Tinker and Fraser tests as applied to this case, 
the Court held that “a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, 
restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably 
                                                                                                                           
 89. Id. at 399 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 62a, Morse, 551 U.S. 393 
(No. 06-278)). 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 37a, supra note 89). 
 93. Id. (quoting Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1118, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2006)).  
 94. Id. at 400. See also DUPRE, supra note 11, at 237-38 (explaining that the order by 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for the principal to pay money damages to a 
difficult student may have prompted the Supreme Court to hear the case, as “[d]uring oral 
argument, some of the justices seemed to be particularly bothered by the damages Deborah 
Morse would have to pay Joe Frederick if the Ninth Circuit opinion stood”). 
 95. Morse, 551 U.S. at 404. 
 96. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). 
 97. Id. at 405. 
 98. Id.  
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viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”99 The Court reasoned that a school’s 
deterrence of drug use by its students is an “important—indeed, perhaps 
compelling” government interest, considering the dangers of illegal drugs 
and their use by school-age children.100 In support of the high degree of this 
governmental interest, the Court also noted the billions of dollars in 
congressional support provided to schools for the purpose of school drug 
prevention programs.101 Given these concerns, it was reasonable for the 
principal to make the on-the-spot decision to conclude that the banner 
promoted illegal drug use, in violation of school policy, “and that failing to 
act would send a powerful message to the students in her charge . . . about 
how serious the school was about the dangers of illegal drug use.”102 In 
allowing a school to regulate speech that could result in harm (whether that 
harm is through the disruption of a school’s educational mission or harm to 
the students themselves), Morse thus articulates a standard similar to 
Tinker.103  
The authority of school officials to discipline a student for his or her 
speech has slowly been reinforced since Tinker was decided in 1969.104 No 
longer must schools predict whether a student’s speech would cause a 
material disruption before a student can be disciplined or the speech 
suppressed.105 Rather, schools can look to the vulgarity, content, and 
appropriateness of student speech to determine whether the speech is 
                                                                                                                           
 99. Id. at 403. But see id. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Frederick’s credible and uncontradicted explanation for the message—he just 
wanted to get on television—is also relevant because a speaker who does not 
intend to persuade his audience can hardly be said to be advocating anything 
. . . The notion that the message on this banner would actually persuade either 
the average student or even the dumbest one to change his or her behavior is 
most implausible. 
Id. 
 100. Id. at 407 (majority opinion) (quoting Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646, 661 (1995)). 
 101. Id. at 408. 
 102. Id. at 410. 
 103. Michael J. O’Connor, Comment, School Speech in the Internet Age: Do Students 
Shed Their Rights When They Pick Up a Mouse?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 459, 467 (2009).  
 104. See Abby Marie Mollen, In Defense of the “Hazardous Freedom” of Controversial 
Student Speech, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1510 (2008) (noting that, since Tinker, the Court 
has “treated school officials as the protagonists and focused on facilitating their 
‘comprehensive authority . . . to prescribe and control conduct in the schools’—an authority 
that Tinker recognized but limited”). 
 105. Morse, 551 U.S. at 404-05.  
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acceptable for school-sponsored expressive activities.106 In addition, school 
officials can discipline students for vulgar or indecent expression.107 
Finally, schools can also discipline students for advocating the use of illegal 
drugs, even at off-campus but school-sponsored events.108 Nevertheless, 
difficulty and disagreements arise when determining which Supreme Court 
test a court should use when reviewing the disciplining or suppression of a 
student’s speech. 
B. Application of Tinker to Student Speech: Evident Confusion in Lower 
Courts 
Even Chief Justice John Roberts has admitted that “[t]here is some 
uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should apply school-
speech precedents . . . .”109 This uncertainty also includes how courts should 
apply school-speech precedents. Though bans on students wearing buttons 
have typically been upheld,110 a small minority of courts address these bans 
in an approach that favors student speech.111 In addition, in the wake of 
anti-Vietnam protests, several circuits struggled with determining whether 
policies of predistribution review of student writings distributed on campus 
were justified under Tinker.112 In Burch v. Barker, the Ninth Circuit stated 
that the Second Circuit’s approval of “broad review and censorship of non-
school-sponsored publications” was “in fundamental conflict with the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Tinker.”113  
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a broad reading of Tinker’s 
rights-of-others exception by permitting a school to forbid students from 
wearing t-shirts with a message condemning homosexuality, reasoning it 
was proper to prevent emotional injury to a particularly vulnerable segment 
                                                                                                                           
 106. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988). 
 107. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986). 
 108. Morse, 551 U.S. at 347, 403.  
 109. Id. at 401. 
 110. THOMAS, CAMBRON-MCCABE, & MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 117. 
 111. See Chandler v. McNinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding, 
in part, that buttons with the word “scab” to protest non-union teachers were not inherently 
disruptive). 
 112. Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 1988) (providing a survey of the 
various approaches taken by Circuit Courts of Appeals). 
 113. Id. at 1156-57.  
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of the student population.114 The United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio took a different approach to whether Tinker 
allows a school to stop a student from wearing a t-shirt with an anti-gay 
message, as it focused on Tinker’s disruption test and found that the student 
should be allowed to wear his shirt without repercussions from school 
officials.115 These disagreements speak to the very real difficulties that 
courts face when determining how and when the Tinker standard governs. 
And this confusion is not merely restricted to a student’s speech at school—
some lower courts are misusing Tinker to censor off-campus student 
expression posted on the Internet.116 
C. Wisniewski: The Second Circuit’s Recent Application of Tinker to Off-
Campus, Online Student Speech 
Despite disagreements about when Tinker controls, courts have generally 
extended the reach of Tinker to include situations where a student’s online 
and off-campus speech is directed at his or her school. In the 2007 case, 
Wisniewski v. Board of Education, the Second Circuit considered whether a 
student could appropriately be suspended for sharing over the Internet a 
drawing “suggesting that a named teacher should be shot and killed.”117 The 
student’s instant messaging icon depicted “a small drawing of a pistol firing 
a bullet at a person’s head, above which were dots representing splattered 
blood.”118 Under the drawing it read, “Kill Mr. VanderMolen,” the 
                                                                                                                           
 114. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006). This was 
the first reported opinion that supported a restriction to a student’s speech by using Tinker’s 
rights-of-others exception. See Calvert, supra note 5, at 1182. 
 115. Calvert, supra note 5, at 1183. 
 116. Id. at 1175. 
 117. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 
1741 (2008). 
 118. Id. The Second Circuit then explained exactly what instant messaging entails:  
Instant messaging enables a person using a computer with Internet access to 
exchange messages in real time with members of a group (usually called 
“buddies” in IM lingo) who have the same IM software on their computers. 
Instant messaging permits rapid exchanges of text between any two members 
of a “buddy list” who happen to be on-line at the same time. Different IM 
programs use different notations for indicating which members of a user’s 
“buddy list” are on-line at any one time. Text sent to and from a “buddy” 
remains on the computer screen during the entire exchange of messages 
between any two users of the IM program. 
Id. at 35. 
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student’s English teacher.119 The student had created this icon “a couple of 
weeks after his class was instructed that threats would not be tolerated by 
the school, and would be treated as acts of violence.”120 This icon was 
available for viewing by the student’s instant messaging contacts for three 
weeks.121 A classmate of the student informed Mr. VanderMolen, who then 
relayed the information to school officials.122 School administration and 
even the police became involved, as there were investigations to determine 
whether the student was a threat to his teacher or any other school 
official.123 The police investigator concluded “that the icon was meant as a 
joke, that [the student] fully understood the severity of what he had done, 
and that [he] posed no real threat to VanderMolen or to any other school 
official.”124 This situation was also brought before a hearing officer, who 
found the icon threatening; though it was created and distributed off-
campus, “she concluded that it was in violation of school rules and 
disrupted school operations . . .”125 As a result, the student was suspended 
for a semester.126 
A suit was then brought on the student’s behalf against the school board 
and the superintendent, alleging in part that the student’s icon was protected 
under the First Amendment.127 The district court determined that “the icon 
was reasonably to be understood as a ‘true threat’ lacking First Amendment 
protection.”128 On appeal, the Second Circuit applied a variation of the 
Tinker standard to the student’s off-campus speech, holding that Aaron’s 
transmission of the icon posed a “reasonably foreseeable risk that the icon 
would come to the attention of school authorities, and that it would 
‘materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the 
school.’”129 
                                                                                                                           
 119. Id. at 36. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. Mr. VanderMolen was so distressed by the threatening buddy icon that he was 
allowed to stop teaching the students’ class. Id. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at 37. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 38-39 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007)). The Second 
Circuit did not consider whether the icon presented a ‘true threat,’ as defined in Watts v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). Id. at 38. “Although some courts have assessed a 
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The Second Circuit found it “reasonably foreseeable that the IM icon 
would come to the attention of school authorities and the teacher whom the 
icon depicted being shot.”130 Further, the court saw no doubt that the icon, 
once discovered by school administration and the teacher it depicted, 
“would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school 
environment.”131 The fact that this was off-campus speech was disregarded, 
as the court noted that the Second Circuit had previously recognized that 
off-campus students could cause a substantial disruption within the 
school.132 Wisniewski’s reliance on Tinker regarding a student’s on-line and 
off-campus speech was further extended by the Second Circuit in Doninger 
v. Niehoff. But the Second Circuit’s decision in Doninger would needlessly 
depart from the holdings of Tinker and Wisniewski in a significant way. 
III. DONINGER TOOK TINKER TOO FAR 
Doninger v. Niehoff involved a dispute between Avery Doninger, a 
junior at Lewis Mills High School (LMHS), and the school’s 
administration.133 While serving as her school’s Junior Class Secretary, 
Avery Doninger was involved in planning “‘Jamfest,’ an annual battle-of-
the-bands concert.”134 A conflict arose with the scheduling of the event, and 
in response, Avery wrote an inflammatory Livejournal blog post with the 
purpose of encouraging her fellow students to contact and “piss off” the 
school district’s “douchebag” superintendent.135 In writing this Livejournal 
                                                                                                                           
student’s statements concerning the killing of a school official or a fellow student against the 
‘true threat’ standard of Watts . . . we think that school officials have significantly broader 
authority to sanction student speech than the Watts [sic] standard allows.” Id.; see also Clay 
Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers & Classmates 
in Cyberspace: The Speech Issue the Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. 
REV. 210, 228 (2009) (“The rule, then, from Wisniewski appears to boil down to a rather 
primitive ‘if-then’ formula: If it is reasonably foreseeable that student speech created off 
campus will come to the attention of school authorities, then school authorities may exert 
disciplinary authority over it.”). 
 130. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39. 
 131. Id. at 40. 
 132. Id. at 39 (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979) (“We 
can . . . envision a case in which a group of students incites substantial disruption within the 
school from some remote locale. We need not, however, address this scenario because, on 
the facts before us, there was simply no threat or forecast of material and substantial 
disruption within the school.”). 
 133. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 134. Id. at 44. 
 135. Id. at 45. 
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blog entry, Avery ignored her Principal’s instructions (which were directed 
to Avery only hours before) that asked her to “work cooperatively with 
[her] faculty advisor and with the administration in carrying out Student 
Council objectives.”136 This blog post was discovered by the superintendent 
some days after the Jamfest dispute was resolved, and only after the 
superintendent’s son found it using an Internet search engine.137 As a result 
of her vulgar comments, Avery was disqualified from running for Senior 
Class Secretary.138 
Avery Doninger’s mother, alleging a violation of her daughter’s First 
Amendment rights, had “moved for a preliminary injunction voiding the 
election for Senior Class Secretary and ordering the school to either hold a 
new election in which Avery would be allowed to participate or to grant 
Avery the same title, honors, and obligations as the student elected to the 
position.”139 The district court denied this motion.140 Justifying the school’s 
jurisdictional reach over Avery’s speech, the Second Circuit in Doninger 
reasoned that not only was it reasonably foreseeable that Avery’s 
Livejournal posting would reach school property, but that her speech was 
directed at the school.141 The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of the 
preliminary injunction motion because “Avery’s blog post created a 
foreseeable risk of substantial disruption at LMHS.”142  
The court relied on three factors to reach this conclusion.143 First, 
Avery’s language on her Livejournal blog post was not only offensive, “but 
also potentially disruptive of efforts to resolve the ongoing controversy.”144 
Second, the court found it significant that Avery’s post used misleading, or 
perhaps even false, information in her attempt to encourage more students 
to communicate with District Superintendent Schwartz.145 Third, it was 
noteworthy that the discipline was related to “Avery’s extracurricular role 
as a student government leader.”146  
                                                                                                                           
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 46. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 43. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 50.  
 142. Id. at 43-44. 
 143. Id. at 50.  
 144. Id. at 50-51. 
 145. Id. at 51 (“It was foreseeable . . . that school operations might well be disrupted 
further by the need to correct misinformation as a consequence of Avery’s post.”). 
 146. Id. at 52. 
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Doninger’s attorney argued that Tinker was not satisfied because the 
controversy at the school may not have been caused by Avery’s Livejournal 
posting.147 Rather, the disruption resulted from Avery’s mass e-mail.148 The 
Second Circuit labeled this argument as misguided, as the argument implied 
“that Tinker requires a showing of actual disruption to justify a restraint on 
student speech.”149 The court reasoned that school officials had a duty to 
prevent the harmful effects of disruptions.150 Therefore, the question was 
not whether damage had been done, but whether school officials “‘might 
reasonably portend disruption’ from the student expression at issue.”151  
This framing of the issue is consistent with Tinker. Tinker’s substantial 
disruption test is forward-looking, and the Second Circuit admitted as 
much.152 But exactly where and when must a school look to put Tinker’s 
test to use? In Wisniewski, the Second Circuit applied Tinker’s substantial 
disruption test not from the moment the student created the threatening 
icon, but upon discovery of the icon by the teacher and by other school 
officials.153 Once the icon was discovered, a police investigator and a 
psychologist had to determine whether the student was a threat to the safety 
of teachers and other school officials.154 Unlike Doninger, Wisniewski 
involved an actual finding of a disruption of school operations by the 
special attention given to the situation by “school officials, replacement of 
the threatened teacher, and interviewing pupils during class time.”155 This 
materialization of a substantial disturbance reinforces the judgment of the 
Second Circuit “that the icon, once made known to the teacher and other 
school officials, would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption 
within the school environment.”156 
Nevertheless, Doninger took a misguided approach regarding when the 
Tinker test should govern. In Doninger, the opportunity for Avery’s speech 
                                                                                                                           
 147. Id. at 51.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. at 51 (“Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption 
actually occurs before they may act.”). 
 153. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007) (“And there can be no 
doubt that the icon, once made known to the teacher and other school officials, would 
foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment.”).  
 154. Id. at 36.  
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. at 40.  
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to be a possible substantial disruption had already passed once school 
administrators discovered the speech.157 Therefore, the court’s framing of 
the question—“whether school officials ‘might reasonably portend 
disruption’ from the student expression at issue”—if applied once the 
communication was discovered, must be answered in the negative.158 Yet 
Avery was still disciplined, though her online speech did not cause actual 
disruption, and the possibility that it would cause a disruption had 
essentially passed.159 This is because the Second Circuit applied Tinker not 
from when school administrators discovered Avery’s speech, but from 
when that speech was first written.160 This use of Tinker’s substantial 
disruption test allows school administrators to punish online student speech 
that caused no substantial disruption in the past and will not cause a 
substantial disruption in the future, though it could have, but did not, cause 
a substantial disruption in the past.  
Such an exercise of Tinker’s substantial disruption test was never 
considered by the Court in Tinker. According to the Court in Morse, 
“Tinker held that student expression may not be suppressed unless school 
officials reasonably conclude that it will ‘materially and substantially 
disrupt the work and discipline of the school.’”161 This test, as Doninger 
clearly noted, allows a school to suppress speech that it reasonably predicts 
will cause disruption.162 At its essence, Tinker allows a school to look to the 
future consequences of a student’s speech to determine whether suppression 
of that speech is justified. The variation of the Tinker test used in Doninger 
is backward-looking, and is thus contrary to Tinker.  
IV. THE PROPOSAL: IGNORE TINKER AND FOCUS ON THE 
EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITY 
Without relying on Tinker, the Second Circuit should have justified the 
disciplining of Avery Doninger solely on the relation of the discipline to 
                                                                                                                           
 157. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46.  
 158. Id. at 51.  
 159. See id. at 45. Avery’s request for students to call and email the school 
administration to gather support for Jamfest was rendered moot after the school 
administration decided to hold Jamfest. The likelihood that the Livejournal posting would 
cause a substantial disruption at school was therefore minimal.  
 160. Id. at 51. Ms. Doninger’s words were “potentially disruptive of efforts to resolve the 
ongoing controversy.” Id. Once her Livejournal posting was discovered, however, the 
dispute was already resolved. Id. at 46. 
 161. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007). 
 162. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51. 
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“Avery’s extracurricular role as a student government leader.”163 The 
prevailing view among the courts, including the Second Circuit, “is that 
conditions can be attached to extracurricular participation, because such 
participation is a privilege rather than a right.”164 Students who participate 
in optional extracurricular activities such as school athletics “have reason to 
expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges.”165 Part of the reason 
for this expected intrusion is that students who choose to participate in 
extracurricular pursuits “voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of 
regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally.”166  
The Supreme Court has recognized this principle in a different context. 
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Supreme Court considered 
whether a school district’s policy that “authorize[d] random urinalysis drug 
testing of students who participate[d] in the District’s school athletics 
programs . . . violate[d] the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution.”167 Justice Scalia, writing for a six-Justice 
majority, found that “legitimate privacy expectations are even less with 
regard to student athletes” than with the general student body.168 In support, 
Justice Scalia noted “an element of ‘communal undress’ inherent in 
athletic” sports,169 and the general lack of privacy to be found in Vernonia’s 
public school locker rooms.170 
                                                                                                                           
 163. Id. at 52. 
 164. THOMAS, CAMBRON-MCCABE & MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 135; see also James 
v. Tallahassee High Sch., 907 F. Supp. 364 (M.D. Ala. 1995), aff’d per curiam, 104 F.3d 
372 (11th Cir. 1996); Albach v. Odle, 531 F.2d 983, 984-85 (stating that “[p]articipation in 
interscholastic athletics is not a constitutionally protected civil right”). 
 165. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995). Some commentators, 
however, have noted that  
[a]lthough students are technically not required to participate in extracurricular 
activities, they are encouraged to do so to the point where nonparticipation 
makes them outcasts, and harms their social, physical, and mental well-being. 
To say that participation in extracurricular activities is optional is to ignore 
their central, critical importance to public education. Students are not 
employees of the school, nor are they, in any realistic sense, free to choose 
non-participation in school activities. 
LaCroix, supra note 10, at 263.  
 166. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657. 
 167. Id. at 648.  
 168. Id. at 657. 
 169. Id. (quoting Schaill v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir.  
1998)). 
 170. See id. 
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The Court also found that athletes in the school district must meet 
insurance requirements, must maintain adequate grades, and must “comply 
with ‘any rules of conduct, dress, training hours and related matters as may 
be established for each sport’” by the school’s administration.171 In light of 
this reduced expectation of privacy from the nature of the extracurricular 
activity and the rules governing the extracurricular activity, and considering 
the unobtrusiveness of the search and the interests of the school district in 
reducing drug use, the Court held that the school district’s random drug 
testing of students who participate in the district’s athletics program does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.172 And importantly, the Court 
recognized similarities between First and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
in public schools: “Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public schools than 
elsewhere.”173 
Like the student-athletes in Vernonia, Avery Doninger was subject to a 
higher standard of conduct than normal students.174 The district court found 
that “[a]s a student leader, Avery had a particular responsibility under the 
school handbook and school policy to demonstrate qualities of good 
citizenship at all times.”175 Principal Niehoff “defined good citizenship as 
respect for others, behaving appropriately and as a good role model, 
working to initiate community connections, and promoting positive 
interactions and conflict resolution,” and she testified that “class officers 
were expected to work toward the objectives of the Student Council, work 
cooperatively with their advisor and with the administration, and promote 
good citizenship both in school and out.”176 Avery Doninger was well 
aware of these requirements, as she signed the school handbook, “which 
included language regarding the social and civic expectations of 
                                                                                                                           
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 664 (“Taking into account all the factors we have considered above—the 
decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity 
of the need met by the search—we conclude that Vernonia’s Policy is reasonable and hence 
constitutional.”). But see id. at 686 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Having reviewed the record 
here, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the District’s suspicionless policy of testing all 
student athletes sweeps too broadly, and too imprecisely, to be reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.” (emphasis added)). 
 173. Id. at 656 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 174. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 52 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 175. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 214 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527 F.3d 41 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
 176. Id. at 214.  
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students.”177 Avery also discussed these responsibilities with Principal 
Niehoff on April 24, 2007—after the original Jamfest email had been sent 
out—where Principal Niehoff “indicated to Avery that such an approach to 
conflict resolution was . . . inappropriate.”178 Defiantly, Avery “posted her 
blog entry the very evening of the day on which that conversation 
occurred.”179 This act of insubordination was “a factor of particular 
relevance” in [Principal Niehoff’s] disciplinary decision.180  
The district court agreed with Principal Niehoff, finding that Avery’s 
LiveJournal blog entry “clearly violates the school policy of civility and 
cooperative conflict resolution.”181 The district court noted that not only 
was Avery’s LiveJournal post “at best misleading, and at worst, entirely 
false,” but that her encouragement for “her readers to contact Ms. Schwartz 
specifically to ‘piss her off more’ [was] hardly the type of constructive 
approach to [dispute resolution] that a school would wish to encourage.”182 
Even worse was that Avery included, in the LiveJournal post, the original e-
mail that Principal Niehoff told Avery violated the school’s Internet 
policy.183 Ms. Doninger even admitted that her daughter’s blog entry was 
offensive, and Avery Doninger “intimated that she opposed the specific 
punishment chosen rather than denying the appropriateness of any 
punishment at all[.]”184 The district court refused to consider the supposed 
harshness of the penalty administered to Avery, noting that “whether 
disqualifying Avery from running for class secretary is a ‘fitting 
punishment’ in the circumstances, or was overly harsh or even too lenient, 
is not for this Court to determine.”185 The court deferentially left that 
question for the school authorities to decide, noting that “[s]uch a question, 
we believe, represents a judgment call best left to the locally elected school 
board, not to a distant, life-tenured judiciary.”186 
The Second Circuit found Avery’s case to closely parallel that of Lowery 
v. Euverard, “which involved a group of high school football players who 
                                                                                                                           
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 214-15. 
 183. Id. at 215. 
 184. Id. Rather than admit she did not deserve to be punished at all, Ms. Doninger 
testified at oral argument that “the punishment didn’t fit the crime.” Id. 
 185. Id. at 202. 
 186. Id.  
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were removed from the team after signing a petition expressing their hatred 
of the coach and their desire not to play for him.”187 In Lowery, the Sixth 
Circuit applied Tinker to this group’s petition, and found the relevant 
question to be whether “the petition might foreseeably frustrate efforts to 
teach the values of sportsmanship and team cohesiveness through 
participation in sport as an extracurricular activity.”188 The Sixth Circuit 
noted that it was well established that “student athletes are subject to greater 
restrictions [on speech] than the student body at large.”189 When players try 
out for a team, they implicitly agree to follow the coach’s rules and to 
submit to the coach’s authority.190 While the students were free to continue 
their campaign to have the coach fired, they were not free to “continue to 
play football for him while actively working to undermine his authority.”191 
Though the circumstances of the cases are certainly similar, the Second 
Circuit should have stopped short of the Sixth Circuit’s use of Tinker.  
Employing Tinker to insubordination by members of a student 
government requires not only that a student break the rules, but also that a 
school official reasonably conclude that the student’s conduct will 
“materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the 
school.”192 Yet not all rule-breaking behavior by a student will rise to the 
Tinker standard. Students like Avery Doninger regularly and voluntarily 
subject themselves to the regulations as a condition of participation.193 To 
apply Tinker to Avery’s conduct as a member of her student council is to 
ignore the principle courts have recognized: school officials may exercise 
broad discretion in establishing training and conduct standards for students 
that participate in extracurricular activities to follow.194  
Instead, courts should review a school’s conditions on extracurricular 
participation under a reasonableness standard like that of Hazelwood.195 
                                                                                                                           
 187. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 52 (2d Cir. 2008); see Lowery v. Euverard, 497 
F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 188. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 52 (quoting Lowery, 497 F.3d at 593, 596). 
 189. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 597. 
 190. Id. at 600. 
 191. Id.  
 192. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). It is 
reasonable to conclude that not all examples of insubordination within an extracurricular 
activity would result in the level of disruption required by Tinker.  
 193. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 214 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527 F.3d 41 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
 194. THOMAS, CAMBRON-MCCABE & MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 136. 
 195. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
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This standard is consistent with the general rule that courts will typically 
afford deference to a school’s formulation of eligibility rules for 
extracurricular activities.196 It is recognized and widely accepted that 
“[s]chools can impose conditions such as skill prerequisites for athletic 
teams, academic and leadership criteria for honor societies, and musical 
proficiency for band and choral groups.”197 Many students are required to 
undergo physical examinations to participate on athletic teams.198 In 
addition, “courts generally approve residency requirements as conditions of 
interscholastic competition.”199 And, the “nationwide trend among school 
districts is to condition extracurricular participation on satisfactory 
academic performance.”200 With respect to school speech doctrines, the 
logical outcome of this deference to school administrators leads to results 
consistent with Vernonia; namely, that students who participate in 
extracurricular activities should expect intrusions upon normal rights, and 
that schools can enforce the conditions of their extracurricular activities.201 
Thus, instead of relying on Tinker, the Second Circuit should have 
upheld the district court’s conclusion that “participation in voluntary, 
extracurricular activities is a ‘privilege’ that can be rescinded when students 
fail to comply with the obligations inherent in the activities themselves.”202 
Avery Doninger’s insubordination, and her use of incendiary language to 
describe the school officials she was subject to, was a clear violation of her 
responsibility to demonstrate qualities of good citizenship at all times. Her 
conduct also worked against the basic interests of the student council, 
which needed a cooperative relationship with the school administration to 
achieve the objectives of the student government. The violation of these 
rules alone was enough to justify the disciplining of Avery Doninger. 
In summary, the Second Circuit should not have used Tinker to justify 
the disciplining of Avery Doninger. This far-reaching employment of the 
                                                                                                                           
 196. THOMAS, CAMBRON-MCCABE & MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 136. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. at 137. 
 199. Id.; see also Doe v. Woodford Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 213 F.3d 921, 923 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(upholding a school district’s decision to exclude a hemophiliac student with hepatitis B 
from participating on a high school junior varsity basketball team). 
 200. THOMAS, CAMBRON-MCCABE & MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 138. 
 201. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995). 
 202. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 52 (2d Cir. 2008). A court’s deference to a 
school’s policies regarding extracurricular activities would not necessarily be automatic. The 
courts could subject these policies—and the disciplining of a student as a result of the 
violation of these policies—to a reasonableness standard that is similar to that in Hazelwood. 
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
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Tinker test allows a school to punish student speech that is unlikely to cause 
a disruption—since the topic of the student speech is already resolved. 
Simply put, Tinker should be interpreted to require a school official to look 
forward in determining whether a student’s speech should be silenced 
and/or punished. Instead of allowing Avery Doninger’s insubordination to 
go unpunished, the Second Circuit should have simply recognized well-
established limitations on the conduct of a student that participates in 
extracurricular activities. Avery Doninger broke the rules governing her 
involvement in student government. It is this fact alone, not the Second 
Circuit’s over-reliance on and misuse of Tinker that justifies the punishment 
administered by the school. 
V. CONCLUSION 
More than ever, today’s students have the means to communicate 
online.203 Most students have in-home access to a personal computer.204 
And, student access to the Internet at home continues to rise.205 Social 
networking websites like Facebook, Myspace, and LiveJournal, as well as 
the instant-messaging communication tools seen in Wisniewski, are seeing 
rapid increases in popularity.206 It is estimated that “two-thirds of the 
world’s Internet population belongs to a social network.”207 The Nielsen 
Company’s research has uncovered that “global consumers spent more than 
five and half hours [sic] on social networking sites like Facebook and 
Twitter in December 2009, an 82% increase from the same time last year 
when users were spending just over three hours on social networking 
                                                                                                                           
 203. See Donald F. Roberts et al., Generation M: Media in the Lives of 8-18 Year-olds, 
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION 30 (Mar. 9, 2005), 
http://www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/Generation-M-Media-in-the-Lives-of-8-18-Year-olds-
Report.pdf (“[I]n 1999, 73% of 8- to 18-year olds reported a personal computer in their 
home; today, 86% report in-home access to a PC. Similarly, the 21% of 8- to 18-year-olds 
[who] reported having a computer in their bedroom in 1999 has grown to 35% reporting 
either a bedroom computer or their own laptop. At the same time computer penetration has 
increased, so too have the computer activities that attract young people.”).  
 204. Id.  
 205. See Home Computer Access and Internet Use, CHILD TRENDS DATABANK, 
http://www.childtrendsdatabank.org/?q=node/298 (last updated June 2011) (“[T]he 
percentage of children who use the internet at home rose from 22 percent in 1997, the first 
year for which such estimates are available, to 42 percent in 2003 . . . .”). 
 206. Jordan McCollum, Social Networking Surpasses Email Popularity, MARKETING PILGRIM 
(Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.marketingpilgrim.com/2009/03/social-networking-surpasses-email-
popularity.html. 
 207. Id. 
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sites.”208 Increased use of social networking websites by students, teachers, 
and school administrators—coupled with online access at schools—will 
undoubtedly lead to an increase in online speech that a school determines to 
be threatening, disruptive, or offensive. School officials will also 
increasingly find themselves in the difficult position of trying to foresee the 
disruption that a student’s online speech may cause. With the increased 
amount of material posted to these websites, legal activity in this arena is 
bound to increase.209 
Because the Supreme Court has not defined the scope of a school’s 
authority to discipline a student’s online and off-campus speech, lower 
courts and schools should step lightly in using existing Supreme Court 
precedent to discipline students. In the absence of a Supreme Court ruling, 
some schools are filling this void by “adopting policies that attempt to 
restrict the online, off-campus speech of their students.”210  Even assuming 
that a school is within its authority to discipline a student’s speech that 
reaches the schoolhouse gate, though it takes place off-campus and online, 
courts should not extend a school’s scope of disciplinary authority beyond 
what Supreme Court precedent reasonably allows.211  
Nevertheless, courts must uphold the authority of schools to discipline a 
student’s online speech if it violates the standard of conduct that an 
extracurricular activity places upon the student. Part of the justification for 
this conclusion is that students that participate in these activities voluntarily 
subject themselves to a higher standard of conduct than that imposed on the 
general student body.212 Further, participation in extracurricular activities—
like student government—is a privilege, not a right, and a school needs 
discretion in its attempts to maintain order, respect, and discipline within 
these activities.213 Where school boards have established rules for 
                                                                                                                           
 208. Led by Facebook, Twitter, Global Time Spent on Social Media Sites up 82% Year over 
Year, NIELSENWIRE (Jan. 22, 2010), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/global/led-by-facebook-
twitter-global-time-spent-on-social-media-sites-up-82-year-over-year. 
 209. THOMAS, CAMBRON-MCCABE & MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 123. 
 210. Calvert, supra note 129, at 219.  
 211. Understandably, the interpretation and application of Supreme Court precedent to 
the realm of a student’s online speech is a difficult task.  
 212. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995).  
 213. This argument poses a question as to when a school’s rules governing 
extracurricular activities are considered to be too much of a burden on a student’s First 
Amendment rights. 
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suspending or expelling students from extracurricular activities, courts 
should require student compliance with the rules.214  
Tinker held that a student’s speech, whether expressive or verbal, may 
not be prohibited or suppressed unless the school reasonably determines 
that it will “materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of 
the school.”215 This substantial disruption test can be a good test for schools 
to use, provided that it is not used retroactively to punish a student for 
online and off-campus speech that could have but did not, and likely will 
not, cause a substantial disruption. By applying Tinker’s test retroactively, 
and not from the moment LMHS school officials discovered the speech, the 
Second Circuit in Doninger needlessly extended the basic character of the 
Tinker test. Instead, the Second Circuit should have reaffirmed a school’s 
authority to hold students that participate in extracurricular activities to a 
higher standard of conduct. Disciplinary action that results from a violation 
of this code of conduct should not be governed by Tinker, but by a 
reasonableness standard similar to that of Hazelwood.  
 
                                                                                                                           
 214. See THOMAS, CAMBRON-MCCABE & MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 135. Though 
such a policy by the courts would defer to a school’s judgment in establishing its own 
extracurricular rules, these rules would likely be subject to a reasonableness standard. See 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
 215. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
